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[Abstract] 5 
The academic and policy debate regarding the role of central banks and financial regulators in addressing 6 
climate-related financial risks has rapidly expanded in recent years. This Perspective presents the key 7 
controversies and discusses potential research and policy avenues for the future. Developing a comprehensive 8 
analytical framework to assess the potential impact of climate change and the low-carbon transition on 9 
financial stability appears to be the first crucial challenge. These enhanced risk measures could then be 10 
incorporated in setting financial regulations and implementing central banks’ policies.  11 
[Main text] 12 
Achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement will require a large-scale shift towards low-carbon 13 
technologies. However, socio-technological transitions often involve disruptive adjustments, even when they 14 
are ultimately beneficial to human welfare.1,2 This process of ‘creative destruction’ is likely to take place also 15 
during the low-carbon transition, with potentially significant repercussions on economic dynamics and 16 
financial stability.3,4 Societies thus face the challenging task of achieving a rapid structural shift to a low-17 
carbon economy, while concurrently avoiding excessive economic losses and safeguarding the stability of the 18 
financial system (see Table 1). 19 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 20 
Central banks and financial regulators have started examining the implications of climate change and the 21 
low-carbon transition in recent years. In 2015, Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England and 22 
Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, first discussed the ‘tragedy of the horizon’ embedded in the 23 
different time spans that characterize monetary and financial stability policies (2-3 years and up to a decade, 24 
respectively) and the much longer-term perspective required to deal with climate-related risks.5 This was 25 
followed by related speeches by other central bankers and regulators.6–12 More recently, a group of eight central 26 
banks and financial regulators from both high-income and emerging economies have formed a ‘Network for 27 
Greening the Financial System’.13 Researchers in academia, international institutions, and civil society 28 
organizations are also investigating the dynamic links between central banks, financial systems and the low-29 
carbon transition.14–20  30 
This Perspective critically discusses the main features of the debate, and identifies avenues for future 31 
research and policy implementation. First, we present the rationale for central banks and financial regulators to 32 
be interested in climate and the low-carbon transition. Second, we analyze their potential role in promoting a 33 
better understanding of climate-related financial risks. Third, we discuss the appropriate scope of their role in 34 
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mitigating these risks. Options range from supporting voluntary risk disclosure by private companies and 35 
investors to mitigating climate-related risks, or even actively promoting low-carbon investments. Finally, we 36 
discuss how these activities would fit into their current mandates, and present open questions for further 37 
research. 38 
Central banks and climate change 39 
Central banks are public institutions with specific objectives determined by their national governments or 40 
legislators. They are typically responsible for monetary policy, which influences the supply and the demand of 41 
money and credit in the economy. Monetary policy is often aimed at achieving price stability, defined in terms 42 
of an explicit inflation rate target. In addition, several central banks also have a mandate to maintain the 43 
stability of the financial system and to regulate and supervise individual financial institutions. Additional 44 
objectives of central banks may include exchange rate stability, employment creation and economic growth.18  45 
Some central banks have started studying the implications of climate change and the low-carbon transition 46 
for the financial sector, primarily due to their responsibility for financial regulation and supervision. Recent 47 
research suggests that, in addition to large physical and economic losses, unmitigated climatic change could 48 
also affect the stability of the financial system.21–23 For instance, the increase in climate-induced physical risks 49 
(e.g. heat waves, floods and storm surges) could have a direct effect on the insurers that cover them. If these 50 
risks are uninsured, the deterioration of the affected households’ and corporates’ balance sheets could lead to 51 
losses for their lender banks.  52 
To avoid physical damages and the associated financial instability, a transition to a carbon-free economy is 53 
ultimately necessary. However, the transition itself might increase the risks of economic dislocation and 54 
‘stranded’ assets (transition risks). For instance, meeting the 2°C temperature threshold will probably require a 55 
large portion of existing reserves of oil, gas and coal to remain in the ground24,25, and thus be written off from 56 
the balance sheets of the companies that own them. Other physical assets that could lose value include part of 57 
the electricity generation capacity, real estate, transportation infrastructure and carbon-intensive industrial 58 
technology.26–28 Such asset stranding could not only lead to economic losses and unemployment, but could also 59 
affect the market valuation of the companies that own these assets, thus negatively impacting their investors, 60 
and potentially triggering cascade effects throughout the interconnected financial system.4,29 61 
While some disruption at the sectoral level is inevitable, the transition as a whole could represent an 62 
opportunity for sustainable and inclusive economic prosperity.30,31 However, this is likely to be possible only in 63 
the presence of a comprehensive and harmonized set of policies aimed at supporting the low-carbon transition 64 
and managing its complex dynamics.  65 
The primary responsibility for strategic planning rests with governments, which have a variety of policy 66 
options at their disposal. For instance, they can introduce environmental regulations (e.g. standards on fuel 67 
efficiency); implement climate-friendly infrastructure investment programs (e.g. smart electrical grids); and 68 
design market-based policies to shift the preferences of households and companies towards low-carbon 69 
activities. The main proposed policy instrument has been carbon pricing, which could be implemented either 70 
through the introduction of a tax on the carbon content of goods and services, or the creation of a cap-and-trade 71 
system of emission allowances.32,33 Other market-based instruments, such as the introduction of subsidies for 72 
clean technologies and a phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies, also follow a similar logic.  73 
Whether a well-designed set of fiscal and environmental policies by the government will prove sufficient to 74 
meet Paris climate objectives is subject to debate. Certain market failures existing in financial systems might 75 
not be properly addressed by pricing mechanisms, thus providing inadequate incentives to mobilize low-carbon 76 
investments at the scale and pace required.14 More importantly, government climate policies might not by 77 
themselves prevent financial instability during the transition; in fact, they might exacerbate transition risks, if 78 
implemented too abruptly and without the necessary precautions. Finally, the perception that carbon pricing 79 
could damage businesses and consumers often makes it a politically unpalatable choice for governments 80 
constrained by the electoral cycle, thus leading them not to act with the strength that would be required to 81 
ensure a smooth transition.  82 
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The complexity of the transition has led researchers to start investigating what central banks and financial 83 
regulators could do to support a rapid and orderly transition. The rest of this Perspective will critically evaluate 84 
the debate over the appropriate scope of their interventions. Four broad types of interventions have been either 85 
adopted by, or suggested for, financial regulators and central banks in dealing with climate-related risks. First, 86 
they can develop methodologies and tools that would promote a better understanding of these risks and their 87 
economic and financial implications. Second, investors can be encouraged or required to disclose their 88 
exposure to climate-related risks. Third, these risks can be explicitly taken into account in setting financial 89 
regulations. Fourth, central banks can take into account climate-related risks in their policy toolkit (e.g. 90 
monetary policy). Table 2 gives an overview of these potential actions. 91 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 92 
Assessing climate-related financial risks  93 
Some central banks have started assessing the exposure of their domestic financial system to climate-related 94 
risks. For instance, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) has recently conducted two studies of the Dutch financial 95 
system showing that, while the exposure to fossil fuel producers is relatively small, the broader exposure to 96 
carbon-intensive sectors is large enough to pose potential systemic risks, and that some of these risks are 97 
already materializing.26,34  Insurers and banks could also experience significant losses as a result of severe 98 
climate-related events. The Bank of England reviewed the exposures of the UK insurance sector to climate-99 
related financial risks in 2015, and is conducting a similar review of the banking sector.35 Other institutions that 100 
have examined the potential impact of climate change or the low-carbon transition on financial stability include 101 
the European Systemic Risk Board, Sweden’s Finansinspektionen and Banque de France.29,36,37 Researchers 102 
have also started developing ‘climate stress-testing’ methods, highlighting how exposures among investors can 103 
exacerbate the impact of the low-carbon transition on the financial system.4,38  104 
However, the assessment of the climate-related financial risks faces various challenges. First, the data 105 
required to perform a comprehensive climate stress test are often absent or insufficiently granular, and hard to 106 
access for researchers outside financial regulatory bodies. Second, an integrated evaluation of climate-related 107 
financial risks cannot rely only on static snapshots: it requires the modelling of the dynamic interactions 108 
between the macroeconomy, the financial system, climate change and environmental policies.  109 
This is not a trivial task. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), traditionally used to study economy-climate 110 
interactions, typically lack a representation of the financial system. Despite some exceptions, Dynamic 111 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, often used by central banks in macroeconomic and monetary 112 
policy analysis, normally abstract from climate change and environmental policies.39 Moreover, benchmark 113 
DSGE models featuring representative agents, rational expectations, and a rapid reversal to equilibrium in 114 
response to shocks are not appropriate for assessing the complex and dynamic implications of a large-scale 115 
structural change. Analyzing these effects will require a framework which features an accurate description of 116 
real and financial interactions between heterogeneous agents, and incorporates the role of fundamental 117 
uncertainty in their decision-making process. Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) and Agent-Based Models (ABM) 118 
might provide valuable alternatives.40–43 These models analyze the macroeconomy as a complex adaptive 119 
system, in which non-linearities and disequilibrium phenomena play a key role. They can also incorporate 120 
network effects that stem from the interactions between agents, and are able to represent the process of 121 
endogenous money creation by commercial banks through bank loans.44 Some central banks have started 122 
developing such models, although without an environmental focus.45,46 However, these are relatively new 123 
methodological approaches and the techniques for estimating and calibrating them are still in development. 124 
Establishing a framework, or a plurality of frameworks, for assessing and quantifying the macro-financial 125 
impacts of climate change and the low-carbon transition thus remains an area that requires further research.  126 
The push for risk disclosure 127 
A key obstacle to the achievement of a smooth low-carbon transition is the low awareness of companies and 128 
investors about their exposure to climate-related financial risks. The majority of companies are not used to 129 
4 
 
assessing how these risks impact their business models, while most investors are unaware of how exposed their 130 
portfolios are. The recent international effort has thus primarily focused on improving information flows by 131 
supporting the disclosure of climate-related risks by private actors. For example, the Financial Stability Board 132 
established a Task Force for Climate-related Financial Disclosures. Its final report makes sector-specific 133 
recommendations on how companies could voluntarily disclose climate-related financial risks, in order to better 134 
inform their investors, lenders and insurance underwriters.47 The French Energy Transition law goes further 135 
and requires listed companies to disclose information on their exposures to climate-related risks and the 136 
measures adopted to reduce them, and requests banks to conduct climate-related stress testing on their portfolio 137 
of loans and disclose the results.48 Several industry- or academia-led initiatives aimed at improving climate-138 
related information available to financial investors also exist.49 However, while central banks have been 139 
supportive of disclosure of climate-related risks by private firms, to date they have not disclosed the exposure 140 
of their own asset portfolios. 141 
The support for the development of voluntary disclosure standards is in line with the wider strategy of 142 
encouraging the financial industry to appropriately price climate-related risks, while respecting the freedom of 143 
enterprise and market dynamics. However, it is still uncertain what the effects of voluntary disclosure will be. 144 
Many large investors appear reluctant to request companies to assess and disclose how they would be affected 145 
by a 2°C-compliant scenario.50 Despite recent progress, climate-related risk disclosures by firms may not 146 
become sufficiently comprehensive, meaningful and comparable in the near term. Investors may also fail to pay 147 
attention to the disclosed information if they are not available in formats that are easy to understand and 148 
comparable across firms.   149 
Thus, further research is needed in refining methodologies for assessing and disclosing climate-related 150 
financial risks facing individual firms.47 Over time, this could lead to more standardized, comparable disclosure 151 
which allows investors to take these risks into account in allocating their capital.  Such research is also likely to 152 
contribute to better classification schemes for ‘green’ assets, and more informative labelling of such assets for 153 
investors.51 Concurrently, the development of spatially-detailed integrated databases of physical assets could 154 
improve risk assessment, even in the absence of disclosure.52  155 
However, existing research suggests that a combination of behavioral biases and misaligned professional 156 
incentives may lead financial markets to be excessively focused on short-term returns and thus not to fully 157 
price climate-related risks, even when information about these is available.53–55 Therefore, risk disclosure and 158 
asset-level data might be made more effective by measures that promote the use of longer-term horizons in 159 
investment decisions.56 160 
Climate-aligned financial regulation 161 
It is in principle possible to go further and adapt financial regulations to take into account climate-related 162 
risks. Macro- and micro-prudential policies (e.g. the Basel III regulatory framework designed in the aftermath 163 
of the financial crisis) encompass a range of regulatory instruments aimed at limiting systemic financial risk, or 164 
specific financial risks facing individual financial institutions. The tools at their disposal vary across 165 
jurisdictions, and could include reserve, liquidity, and capital requirements, caps on loan-to-value ratios and 166 
ceilings on credit growth, in some cases aimed at specific sectors.57,58 In some cases institutions holding riskier 167 
assets are required to satisfy more stringent regulatory requirements, e.g. to fund their assets with more equity 168 
than otherwise. Recent research suggests that this might have negatively affected the willingness of banks to 169 
lend to low-carbon projects, because of their higher perceived risk, low liquidity and long tenor.59 However, 170 
current prudential regulation does not explicitly account for climate-related risks. Implementing a more 171 
comprehensive assessment of risk could instead lead to a higher capital requirement on carbon-intensive assets, 172 
in consideration of their higher transition risks.60,61 If this in turn leads to an increase in the cost of financing 173 
high-carbon activities, it could also have the effect of re-directing lending towards low-carbon activities. 174 
Some emerging market central banks have used prudential policies to mitigate environment-related risks or 175 
encourage lending to low-carbon activities.62 For example, Banque Du Liban differentiates reserve requirement 176 
ratios - i.e. the required ratio of central bank reserves held by private banks to their stock of deposits – 177 
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according to the amount of bank lending flowing to renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.63 Banco 178 
Central do Brasil requires commercial banks to incorporate environmental risk factors into their governance 179 
framework and demonstrate how these risks are evaluated when calculating their capital needs.64 The People’s 180 
Bank of China is in the process of incorporating green financing into its ‘Macro-Prudential Assessment’ (MPA) 181 
framework.65 182 
The idea that financial regulations could take into account climate-related risks more explicitly appears to be 183 
gaining political traction also in high-income countries. The EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable 184 
Finance has recently suggested to explore the option of introducing ‘brown-penalizing’ or ‘green-supporting’ 185 
factors on capital requirements depending on the sustainability risks carried by the borrowing sectors.56,66 The 186 
European Commission has proposed that the European Supervisory Agencies integrate environmental, societal 187 
and governance (ESG) criteria into their work, in order to enable them to monitor how financial institutions 188 
identify, report and address the risks that such factors may pose to financial stability.67  189 
There are still several areas of concern over the effectiveness of such measures. First, there is the danger that 190 
reducing capital requirements on bank loans to low-carbon investments could jeopardize prudential policy 191 
objectives. More in general, the role of capital requirements is to mitigate risks; their design should thus remain 192 
risk-based. Second, climate-aligned prudential policy could be too blunt a tool if applied to banks’ exposures to 193 
entire productive sectors or companies, as it would not be able to discriminate within carbon-intensive sectors 194 
(e.g. utilities) those companies that engage in low-carbon investments. However, estimating banks’ capital 195 
requirements based on the ‘greenness’ of specific investment projects might overburden banks with assessment 196 
exercises they are not familiar with. Third, high-carbon companies could bypass the tightening of prudential 197 
policy in one jurisdiction by raising funds on the international financial markets, unless such policies are 198 
implemented across all major jurisdictions.  199 
Given the concerns above, financial regulators in high-income countries may not consider reflecting climate-200 
related financial risks in the calibration of prudential policy tools unless there is compelling evidence that the 201 
exposure of the financial sector to these risks is sufficiently large. This calls for further innovative research in 202 
the field of climate stress-testing and macroeconomic modelling aimed at quantifying climate-related financial 203 
risks.  204 
A ‘green’ Quantitative Easing? 205 
It has also been proposed that central banks might wish to consider aligning their monetary policy tools to 206 
environmental sustainability goals.68 Prior to the 2007-8 global financial crisis, major central banks operated 207 
monetary policy primarily through adjustments of the reference interest rate. In the aftermath of the crisis, 208 
many central banks have also initiated ‘unconventional’ Quantitative Easing (QE) measures in the form of 209 
large-scale purchase of financial assets, such as government and corporate bonds, in order to provide additional 210 
stimulus to the economy. 211 
Central banks’ QE programs are intended to be temporary cyclical tools.  As such, they have been designed 212 
to avoid ‘distorting’ the market, while concurrently ensuring that assets being purchased meet high credit 213 
standards. The European Central Bank (ECB), for instance, buys sovereign bonds respecting the current 214 
maturity distribution, and allocates purchases of corporate bonds across sectors according to the current bond 215 
market sectoral weights.69,70 However, recent research suggests that the ‘market-neutral’ corporate bond 216 
purchases have inadvertently favored large carbon-intensive companies, reflecting their relatively strong credit 217 
ratings and the fact that many low-carbon firms are too small to issue corporate bonds.71 When central banks 218 
buy a type of asset in large quantities, market participants might assess this asset category more liquid and less 219 
risky than others. This raises a concern that central banks’ asset purchases, even if temporary, could have the 220 
unintended consequence of perpetuating the current ‘carbon lock-in’ of the economic system, thus undermining 221 
their own effort of encouraging financial markets to better account for climate-related risks.  222 
To mitigate this undesired effect, it has been suggested that central banks could recalibrate QE purchases so 223 
to exclude carbon-intensive financial assets and favor bonds issued to fund low-carbon projects.16,72,73 224 
Alternatively, central banks could keep their current QE programs unchanged and run a parallel independent 225 
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program focused on purchasing additional low-carbon financial assets. This ‘green’ QE would have the benefit 226 
of providing large amounts of additional liquidity to companies interested in shifting to clean forms of 227 
production. The overall purchases by the ECB during 2017, for instance, amounted to around €730 billion, 228 
while the total additional annual investment required to achieve EU energy and climate targets are estimated at 229 
€170 billion.55,63 Central banks could expand the proportion of purchases in ‘green’ bonds, which represent a 230 
niche but rapidly expanding market, estimated at €221 billion globally in 2016.75 These bonds can be issued by 231 
companies, development banks, local authorities or, more recently, governments. 232 
Among the proposals discussed here, this is probably the one that has raised greatest controversy. This is 233 
primarily due to the fact that central banks view QE as a cyclical policy instrument aimed at providing 234 
temporary stimulus to the economy. Using it to engineer a low-carbon structural change might overburden 235 
central banks with additional responsibilities and potentially compromise their effectiveness in maintaining 236 
price stability. Moreover, low-carbon assets often do not meet the existing financial risk standards to be 237 
included into the list of eligible assets for central bank purchase, which mainly consist of investment grade 238 
bonds – i.e. bonds with low default risk. Purchasing riskier green assets could raise concerns regarding the 239 
quality of central banks’ portfolio, particularly when central banks do not have the capacity to evaluate the 240 
relative merits of new technologies in times of disruptive change. Finally, introducing strict low-carbon 241 
requirements for central bank asset purchase might reduce the universe of purchasable assets. For these and 242 
other reasons, the idea of explicitly supporting the low-carbon transition via a ‘green QE’ has been repeatedly 243 
rejected by central bankers.9  244 
It should be noted, however, that an indirect form of green QE might already be happening through the 245 
purchase of bonds issued by public sector entities that finance low-carbon activities. For example, the ECB 246 
allocates around 10% of its Public Sector Purchase Programme to bonds issued by ‘supranational institutions’, 247 
which include several regional and national development banks.74 Development banks have been at the 248 
forefront of climate mitigation financing in recent years.76,77 For instance, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 249 
dedicates a minimum of 25% of its lending to climate action projects.78 Thus, the ECB might already be 250 
indirectly supporting low-carbon investments, although to a limited extent, through the inclusion of EIB-issued 251 
bonds in its QE program.     252 
Central bank mandates 253 
Ultimately, what central banks and financial regulators will do to support a smooth low-carbon transition 254 
will depend on what their mandate allows, how this is interpreted, and their willingness to act. The mandates 255 
and policy tools at the disposal of central banks significantly differ across countries. In particular, a distinction 256 
can be drawn between the central banks of high-income regions and the central banks of developing 257 
economies. 258 
Most central banks in high-income countries have relatively narrow mandates primarily focused on price 259 
stability and, in some cases, financial stability and regulation of individual financial institutions. They are 260 
typically granted operational independence in order to achieve specific objectives within their mandate. Thus, 261 
they normally avoid interfering either with market dynamics or government policies, unless it is necessary to 262 
achieve their objectives. Consequently, they have thus far mainly sought to enhance the resilience of the 263 
financial system to climate-related risks by developing and promoting the use of better information and 264 
portfolio assessment tools (e.g. climate stress tests). Other measures taken include international collaboration 265 
for nurturing green financial markets, including through the Green Finance Study Group of the G20, the 266 
Sustainable Insurance Forum, and the Network for Greening the Financial system (NGFS).13,79,80 267 
By contrast, central banks in emerging and developing countries have used a wider set of tools to target 268 
sectors linked to environmental sustainability, reflecting their mandates that are both broader and more strongly 269 
linked to governments’ development objectives. For instance, the Reserve Bank of India requires that 270 
commercial banks allocate a certain proportion of lending to a list of ‘priority sectors’, which now include 271 
renewable energy.81 The Bangladesh Bank has introduced a minimum credit quota that financial institutions 272 
have to allocate to green sectors, currently set at 5%, and offers refinancing lines to commercial banks at 273 
preferential terms for their green loans.82 While not in an emerging economy, the Bank of Japan’s Loan 274 
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Support Program also offers loans at below market rate to financial institutions in order to support several 275 
‘lending priority sectors’, including ‘environment businesses’.83  276 
A key question is whether central banking institutions in high-income countries are likely to modify their 277 
mandates in order to start using their policy tools to explicitly support the financing of low-carbon activities. 278 
Changes in central bank mandates are far from unprecedented. The first central banks were established to 279 
enhance the financial power of the sovereign during military conflicts.84 Over time, the responsibilities of 280 
central banks have transformed in response to economic events and changing monetary practices. For the 281 
majority of the 20th century central banks had a larger range of objectives than today, including high or full 282 
employment, exchange rate stability, management of government deficits and support to strategic industrial 283 
sectors (in particular in the post-World War II period85). With the consent of national governments, they have 284 
also often implemented policies supporting or repressing specific sectors of the economy, sometimes stretching 285 
beyond their usual boundaries of operation.86  286 
However, despite this historical experience, it seems unlikely that central bank mandates in high-income 287 
countries will be modified to include wider societal goals, such as supporting a low-carbon transition. 288 
Moreover, the question of whether this would be appropriate requires further examination. On the one hand, 289 
there is an increasing recognition that climate change and the low-carbon transition might pose system-wide 290 
risks to the macroeconomic and financial system, which may justify more proactive interventions by a wider 291 
set of public institutions, including central banks and financial regulators. On the other hand, widening their 292 
mandate – for example to support credit to low-carbon investment projects – could risk overburdening central 293 
banks with excessive responsibilities, which could take up management capacity to the detriment of their 294 
primary objectives of maintaining monetary and financial stability. Moreover, as unelected institutions, it may 295 
be undesirable to confer central banks additional powers and responsibilities over a broad range of social and 296 
environmental issues for which credible accountability frameworks are difficult to design.  297 
Incorporating climate-related risks  298 
While a change in mandate seems unlikely, this may not be necessary in order for central banks in high-299 
income countries to support the transition to a low-carbon economy. In case climate-related financial risks are 300 
found to be material to the stability of the financial system, this could ultimately justify the implementation of 301 
measures aimed at mitigating them across all central banking operations.  302 
Central banks could incorporate climate-related criteria in assessing whether an asset should be eligible for 303 
central banks’ asset purchase as part of their standard portfolio management. The DNB already applies ESG 304 
criteria and purchases green bonds for own-account investments.87  The Swiss National Bank has its own 305 
ethical criteria to exclude a certain set of companies from its foreign equity purchase.88 The Norges Bank has 306 
ESG criteria for the government’s pension fund that it manages, and explicitly excludes companies involved in 307 
coal-based energy production or responsible for severe environmental damage.89 Central banks could consider 308 
applying these criteria to cyclical policy measures, such as the current QE programs. The objective would not 309 
be to support financing of low-carbon investments, but to prevent the purchase of assets that do not satisfy 310 
financial risk standards, where risk is assessed using more comprehensive methodologies that include climate-311 
related criteria. 312 
The same principle could be applied to central banks’ collateral frameworks. The collateral framework 313 
defines assets that financial institutions can pledge in order to borrow from the central bank, as well as the 314 
amount that they can borrow against those assets. The criteria used by central banks to establish the eligibility 315 
of an asset as collateral and the ‘haircut’ imposed could have deep impact on the desirability - and thus price - 316 
of the asset.90 Being included in the collateral framework gives an incentive to issue such financial instruments 317 
in larger quantities, which could in turn have an impact on the economy.91,92 Central banks could therefore 318 
consider incorporating climate-related risks explicitly in determining the list of eligible collateral and the size 319 
of the haircut. 320 
Conclusions and future avenues of research 321 
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The primary responsibility for managing the transition to a low-carbon economy rests with the elected 322 
governments. However, if it is true that climate change is indeed ‘the greatest and widest-ranging market 323 
failure ever seen’,93 the effort for a smooth low-carbon transition will require the implementation of a 324 
comprehensive set of policies, some of which might require the collaboration of central banks and financial 325 
regulators.  326 
This cooperation will not require a modification of central banks’ mandate. Supporting the development of 327 
more comprehensive measures of financial risk to include climate physical and transition risks is well within 328 
their present mandate of ensuring effective functioning of financial markets. These more comprehensive 329 
measures can then be applied to test and disclose the climate-related exposure of both the financial system as a 330 
whole and individual financial institutions. If these risks are evaluated to be material to the stability of the 331 
financial system, central banks and financial regulators should consider reflecting them in their regulatory and 332 
asset eligibility assessment frameworks.  333 
Several open questions and research gaps remain. First, despite the recent growth of work on the topic,94 334 
further progress is needed in developing robust methodologies and collecting comprehensive data for 335 
evaluating climate-related risks which companies and investors are exposed to. The push for risk disclosure, the 336 
development of asset-level databases and the refinement of climate stress-test techniques will all contribute in 337 
filling this gap. Progress in this direction will help firms to disclose climate-related risks in a comparable 338 
manner, and support central banks and financial regulators to better assess the exposure of both individual 339 
financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. Further research in these areas will also help central 340 
banks to evaluate climate-related risks in their own asset portfolios. It will also contribute to developing a 341 
definition of green or sustainable investment, which is both widely accepted and used by investors. Having a 342 
clear and widely accepted methodology and taxonomy could also help central banks in considering the case for 343 
disclosing climate-related risks in their own asset porfolios.  344 
Second, there is the need to develop models that enable a forward-looking assessment of climate-related 345 
risks and their social and macroeconomic repercussions. This is particularly relevant for the evaluation of the 346 
potential effects of the policies discussed in this article on growth, employment, distribution and financial 347 
stability. The analysis of these effects is challenging since policies are likely to involve time-dependent trade-348 
offs and might have undesirable or unexpected implications (e.g. rebound effects). This will require combining 349 
dynamic macroeconomic modelling (possibly using a plurality of methodological approaches: IAMs, ABMs, 350 
DSGE and SFC models), financial data and modelling, climate scenarios, historical analysis and political 351 
economy considerations. Central banks can be instrumental in supporting such efforts and facilitating the 352 
exchange of best practices across modelling communities. 353 
Making progress in the directions outlined above is urgently needed in order to sustain the momentum 354 
in ”greening” the financial system, which will require collaboration across the research community, financial 355 
market participants, financial regulators and central banks. Researchers can best contribute in this process by 356 
developing practically and immediately useful methodologies for evaluating climate-related risks and their 357 
wider economic impact, and refine these over time.       358 
 [End] 359 
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Table 1 The low-carbon transition trade-off 
  No transition ‘Rapid and orderly’ transition Abrupt transition 
Short term  No stranded assets Limited stranding of assets 
Stranded physical assets   (e.g. fossil 
reserves and carbon-intensive 
capital)25,27   
Stranded financial assets   (loss in 
market valuation and cascade 
effects)4 
Long term  
Large-scale climate 
damages to productive 
assets95 
Climate-induced financial 
losses23 
Limited climate damages 
to physical and financial 
assets 
Limited climate damages to physical 
and financial assets 
Potential long-term economic 
repercussions resulting from asset 
stranding  
 
 
Table 2 Environment-friendly interventions by central banks and financial regulators 
 
  Concept Selected current applications 
Research 
Assessment of climate-related 
financial risks 
Develop and apply methodologies to identify and 
measure climate-related risks to financial institutions 
De Nederlandsche Bank34, Bank of England35 
Macroeconomic modelling of 
low-carbon transition 
Develop modelling tools to assess the wider impact of 
climate risks and the transition 
Only outside of central banks and regulators (private sector and 
academia) 
Policy 
Support to international 
activities on green finance 
Enhance knowledge, cooperation and diffusion of good 
practices 
G20 Green Finance Study Group79, Sustainable Insurance Forum80, 
Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS)13 
Disclosure of climate-related 
financial risks 
Enforce or encourage voluntary disclosure of climate-
related financial risks by firms  
FSB Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures47, French 
Energy Transition Law48 
Environmentally-aligned 
prudential regulation policy 
Incorporate environmental considerations into prudential 
regulation 
Banque du Liban63, Banco Central do Brasil64 
Green central bank financing Provide additional/subsidized liquidity to banks lending to environment-friendly activities 
Bangladesh Bank82, Bank of Japan83 
Lending quotas Impose a minimum proportion of bank lending to flow to environment-friendly sectors 
Reserve Bank of India81, Bangladesh Bank82 
ESG factors in asset eligibility 
criteria  
Include ESG criteria in the evaluation of the overall risk 
of an asset purchased or accepted as collateral  
Only for own purchase, e.g. De Nederlandsche Bank87, Norges 
Bank89 
Green Quantitative Easing 
Purchase ‘green’ assets as part of Quantitative Easing 
programs 
Assets purchased only if they meet the central bank’s eligibility 
criteria, e.g. EIB bonds74 
 
